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Eco-Logic for the Composition Classroom RICHARD M. COE
For we may rest assured that whenever we express ourselves ill, there is, besides mismanagement of language, for the most part some mistake in our manner of conceiving the subject.-Hugh Blair THIS ARTICLE is not about a new way to teach composition; it is rather about new content that belongs in contemporary composition and rhetoric courses however they may be taught. Here is a definition of a key term in the article:
eco-logic [from the modern English, ecology; from the Greek oikos, house or habitation, as in oikonomia, economy; the prefix eco-connotates wholeness1] 1. A logic designed for complex wholes. 2. Any logic which considers wholes as wholes, not by analyzing them into their component parts. 3. Esp., a logical model appropriate for ecological phenomena.
Most composition textbooks are dominated by rhetorical modes that divide wholes into smaller units to be discussed individually or serially. The most common modes of development in textbooks which overtly present such modes are illustration, analogy, definition by genus and differentia, classification, division, comparison/contrast, process-analysis, and cause-to-effect analysis. Illustration is a rhetorical equivalent of induction; analogy is a rhetorical equivalent of deduction. All the remaining modes are ways to break down a subject into units which will be easier to handle. In process-1A Greek household was the smallest selfsufficient unit in the Greek economy. It was whole in the sense that it could survive without interacting with the rest of the economy. Consequently the Greek prefix oiko-had a connotation of wholeness which the modem English "household" does not but which the moder English prefix eco-retains.
analysis, for example, a whole process (e.g., teaching someone to swim) is broken down into a series of steps, which are then arranged and discussed in linear order.
These modes are highly appropriate to a particular type of subject: phenomena in which the whole is roughly equivalent to the sum of its parts. They are, however, inadequate for discussing the more complex phenomena which are increasingly relevant to contemporary realities. Our traditional rhetoric reflects the logic which dominated Western science and culture from the early-seventeenth through the mid-twentieth centuries.
That logic was precisely the opposite of an eco-logic: far from being designed for understanding wholeness, it was a set of methods for reducing wholes into component parts, which could then be arranged in order and analyzed individually. Most of our thinking-from common sense to intrinsic literary criticism-is still based on this logic; many contemporary problems, especially our ecological difficulties, result in part from our using this It is no longer possible for any intellectually-informed person to think simply in terms of being logical vs. being illogical.
As any mathematician or anthropologist can confirm, there are various logics. As long as we are socializing students to observe, think, and express themselves in particular modes, therefore, we may well choose modes which will be particularly useful in today's (and tomorrow's) world.
My thesis is that we should teach rhetorical modes based on eco-logic as well as on analytic logic.
In an article of this length I will not be able to provide full inductive proof of this thesis or even a complete definition of eco-logic. I shall therefore proceed by illustration.
One ecological principle is that meaning is relative to context. It is thereby a fallacy to discuss a subsystem without considering the whole system or to discuss anything out of context. Unlike some eco-logical principles which appear to be radical departures from ordinary common sense, this one is merely an amplification of a familiar notion.
I will begin with a relatively complex example because eco-logic is not really necessary below a certain level of logical complexity. The Hindu "superstition" which protects India's sacred cows from being butchered for food is often criticized by Westerners, especially when we are asked to donate wheat during an Indian famine. Whatever the religious validity of not eating cattle because the souls of one's ancestors may inhabit the bodies of the cattle, the Westerners' common sense tells them that it is impractical not to eat available beef when one is hungry. That conclusion is true in the So long as the response is "ordinary" or the context "normal," we can ignore the principle that meaning is relative to context. That is the basis for the oldfashioned distinction between rules and principles. A rule is hard-and-fast-within a limited set of contexts-and can be memorized. A principle is more broadly useful-because it is usually about a relationship to contexts-but it requires thought. The rule that one should drive on the right side of the road works well in North America; in Europe, one would be better off with a principle about following local driving customs.
It was easy a decade ago to have backpackers memorize a rule about burying non-burnable garbage, but when the number of backpackers per acre reached a level where cans were being buried faster than steel can decompose, the rule had to be changed. The principle of preserving the natural eco-system now led to a new rule: carry out your non-burnable garbage. In the short run, rules are often easier; in the long run, principles are more effective, and they also teach people to think for themselves. 3. Hospitalized with a painful, incurable disease, Arthur begged Charles to put him out of his misery, and Charles complied.
Charles was in the Secret Service;
he saw a man about to fire a rifle at the president. As he pulled his pistol, he realized the man was his brother, Arthur. Instantly, he shot him.
The old discussion exercise of choosing six out of ten people for a fallout shelter operates similarly if you then remake the choice for a lifeboat, a Peace Corps team, and a social club.
Contextual relativity has been ecologically valid for Homo sapiens. We are the most highly adaptable species on this planet because we are not ruled by highly-structured, rigid instincts. Instead we are able to behave in ways that are appropriate to surviving in various environments.
A male stickleback fish can have an instinctive reaction to the color red because in his normal environment the only red object will be another male stickleback, whom he should chase out of his territory. The honeybee can have a similarly rigid reaction to redness because Once a context of expectation exists, the absence of an expected message can be as meaningful as, or more meaningful than, the message. e.e. cummings's not using standard capitalization is an excellent example. A writer using non-standard spelling may be communicating illiteracy so loudly as to destroy the credibility of the intended message. According to structural linguists, the context of a word includes all the other words which could have been used in its place.
If I say "law enforcement officer," a speaker of American English knows that I did not say "policeman" or "cop" and evaluates my message accordingly.
One could go on, almost forever, elucidating the various applications of the general principle that meaning is relative to context. Some sub-principles fall close to home in areas which have traditionally been discussed in English classes, like communication, language, clear thinking, etc. Other sub-principles fall on foreign soil, like the hard sciences. Let me draw just one more implication. If this principle is correct, our traditional rhetoric was not wrong. Neither was our traditional logic or our traditional perceptions. It is just that within the past few decades the world has changed so much that our traditional perceptions, logic, and rhetoric are no longer as well adapted as they once were. Consequently, they sometimes lead us into error.
When scientists started considering new types of problems, they were forced to find new logic systems and, at least mathematically, a new rhetoric. Those of our students who will become scientists could well use a verbal rhetoric which emphasized systemic interrelations instead of analytic separations. The same is true for citizens who will have to discuss ecological problems, the complexities of living in a mass society, or even the question of which traditions to retain and which to revise as the world changes.
This article has discussed one principle upon which that new rhetoric should be based if it is to create dialogues which will lead to useful understandings of contemporary realities. Elsewhere I have 
